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Do Relatively More Efficient Firms Demand Additional Audit
Effort (Hours)?
Dafydd Mali, Sheffield Hallam University
Hyoung-joo Lim, Kyonggi University
We examine whether firms with higher relative efficiency (operational performance) require additional audit
effort (hours) to signal audit quality to demonstrate that their financial reporting systems are robust. Therefore,
we use a Korean sample of publicly listed firms because of the Korean audit hour policy which mandates
that audit hour information be made available for market participants. We find that client firms with higher
relative efficiency have higher audit hours, suggesting that management has an incentive to demand additional
audit hours for signalling purposes, and that shareholders, amongst other stakeholders, have an incentive to
demand external monitoring to reduce potential agency problems. The results show that relative efficiency is a
unique measure of firm performance that can provide insights into a client firm’s business and audit risk. We
also find evidence suggesting that audit firms do not subject clients to a fee (fee per hour) premium based on
relative efficiency, supporting our finding that client firms require audit effort for signalling purposes. Thus,
our results have important implications for policymakers about audit effort demand.
We question whether the argument that firmswith higher levels of relative efficiency re-quire higher levels of audit effort in hours
to signal efficiency performance is genuine, relative to
inefficient peers. The productivity literature divides ef-
ficiency into two measures, absolute efficiency and rel-
ative efficiency. Absolute efficiency is estimated using
simple accounting ratios that capture performance by
dividing earnings with total asset or equity values. Rel-
ative efficiency estimates performance as an aggregate
measure of the most efficient utilisation of resources
and costs that are directly under the control of man-
agement to generate sales. Recent studies show relative
efficiency is inherently more informative compared to
absolute efficiency because it captures managerial op-
erational performance (Combs et al. 2005; Crook et al.
2008; Demerjian et al. 2012; Frijns et al. 2012). Relative
efficiency performance information can be considered
important to various stakeholders. Market participants
may therefore seek assurances that financial reporting
quality is robust to legitimise business activities by de-
manding external monitoring in the form of audit ef-
fort. However, whether the management of client firms
accommodates market participants is a question that re-
mains unanswered.
We have several motivations to conduct this study.
First, the relationship between relative efficiency and au-
dit effort can be interpreted from both audit demand
and supply theory perspectives (Simunic 1980). Nu-
merous audit supply studies consider that audit firms
control audit effort and request a fee premium based
on their incentives to reduce litigation threats and rep-
utational damage (Weber et al. 2008; Cahan et al. 2009;
Skinner and Srinivasan 2012). Thus, in the audit liter-
ature, increasing audit fees (input) can be interpreted
as a signal of higher audit risk (output) based on the
incentives of audit firms. However, Enron and similar
infamous collapses suggest that audit firms can control
audit fees without imparting audit effort. Due to the
unavailability of audit hour information on annual re-
ports in most countries, empirical results linking audit
demand based on firm performance characteristics are
limited. However, we conjecture that client firms with
higher efficiency performance would demand audit ef-
fort in hours (input) to signal higher audit quality (out-
put). We base our assumption on the following. First,
additional audit effort (hours) is shown to be demanded
by shareholders to reduce agency problems (Lobo and
Zhao 2013; Lee et al. 2014). Therefore, we posit that
shareholders are likely to demand incrementally higher
audit effort, as managerial performance improves to re-
duce agency problems and legitimise annual report in-
formation. Second, Defond and Zhang (2014) suggest
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that audit hours can be considered a direct driver of au-
dit quality and ‘value adding’. Thus, to accommodate
the information needs of external stakeholders, manage-
ment may have incentives to require sufficient audit ef-
fort to signal that firm performance is genuine. Third,
relative efficiency captures performance as sales gener-
ated from the resources and expenses under the direct
control of managers. It is therefore likely that the most
efficient/effective managers have an incentive to accom-
modate the demands of stakeholders to face less opposi-
tion to warrant remuneration payments based on robust
performance. Therefore, whilst it is established that au-
dit firms have an incentive to reduce risk by demanding
a fee premium, we are motivated to discover whether
audit firms accommodate the audit hour demand of
their clients. Capturing incentives to increase/decrease
audit demand would offer a unique insight into the be-
haviour of stakeholders.
Second, there has been an increasing demand to im-
prove audit quality internationally. Currently, the policy
to enhance audit quality in Europe is the mandatory au-
dit firm rotation rule. The mandatory audit firm rota-
tion rule was adopted in South Korea (2006) before it
was adopted in Europe (2016), but was considered in-
effective due to a reduction in audit quality (Choi et al.
2017; Mali and Lim 2018). An audit policy that has been
implemented in South Korea since 2001 mandates audit
hours and fees be recorded on annual reports. In Eu-
rope and in other major economies, audit information
can be considered opaque because audit disclosures may
not be directly comparable. Moreover, in the literature
there is evidence that audit hours improve audit quality
(Ettredge et al. 2014), but audit firms feel time pressure
to conduct audits (Guénin-Paracini 2014; Lambert et al.
2017). Therefore, we are motivated to provide insights
for international legislators about the Korean audit hour
policy that requires firms to list audit effort information
on annual reports on a comparable basis. Finally, previ-
ous accounting studies associate signalling theory with
education, corporate social responsibility (CSR), divi-
dends and earnings management. We are motivated to
associate audit effort and a firm’s relative performance
using a signalling theory framework to capture client
firm signalling through audit-level demand.
Our study demonstrates a positive relation between
audit effort and relative efficiency. We interpret that au-
dit firms and market participants are interested in rel-
ative efficiency because it captures a client firm’s abil-
ity to generate sales from resources and costs that are
utilised by managers. From a market participant per-
spective, we also interpret that audit hours capture audit
quality. Therefore, we surmise that as relative efficiency
increases, additional audit hours demonstrate that fi-
nancial reporting quality and financial performance is
robust. Next, we conduct an analysis to establish the
relationship between audit fees/fees per hour and rela-
tive efficiency. Our fee analysis shows consistent results.
However, our results are insignificant when we capture
the relation between relative efficiency and audit fee per
hour. The results suggest that client firms demand ad-
ditional audit hours based on relative efficiency, but do
not incur a higher audit fee. We interpret that relative ef-
ficiency is a measure of firm performance and not con-
sidered by audit firms as a measure of audit or business
risk.
For robustness, we separate our samples into groups
with different levels of risk; investment grade (IG)
and non-investment grade (NIG) credit ratings, and
larger/smaller firms that are listed on the Korea Com-
posite Stock Price Index (KOSPI) and Korean Securi-
ties Dealers Automated Quotations (KOSDAQ) stock
exchanges. Our additional analyses show that regardless
of sample selection criteria, relative efficiency is posi-
tively related to audit effort. However, we find a different
relationship between return on assets (ROA) (a measure
of absolute efficiency) and relative efficiency, suggesting
that audit firms and market participants perceive both
types of efficiency to be incrementally informative but
different in terms of performance.
Our results make several contributions to the litera-
ture. First, the audit hour (effort) literature is mixed.
There is evidence of both a positive (Simunic 1980;
Deis and Giroux 1992; O’Keefe et al. 1994) and negative
(Caramanis and Lennox 2008; Jung 2016) relationship
between firm risk and audit hours. Our results clearly
demonstrate a positive relationship between efficiency
performance and audit effort in hours. Whilst audit
firms are known to increase their audit effort (fee) when
auditing high-risk clients (as suggested in the literature),
firms with high performance request high levels of au-
dit hours for signalling purposes in South Korea because
it is well known that audit hour information is pub-
licly available. Second, South Korea can be considered
a unique case study for the academic community and
legislators. Korea is a developed country in terms of eco-
nomic power, but a developing country when it comes
to legal infrastructure (Wood 2013). South Korea im-
plemented a policy to mandate that publicly listed firms
record audit hour information on annual reports in
2001, following major financial collapses. Therefore, we
utilise a unique dataset to provide valuable insights into
both developing and developed countries to demon-
strate the effect of the policy on the Korean market.
Finally, the productivity literature is divided into ab-
solute and relative efficiency. Baik et al. (2013) show
that relative efficiency can be considered a different
form of efficiency performance compared to absolute
efficiency, but both demonstrate a consistent relation-
ship with firm performance. To the best of our knowl-
edge, we are the first to capture that relative efficiency
and absolute efficiency may be interpreted differently
by market participants based on different directional
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relationships with audit effort. The results are likely to
be of interest to analysts who have an incentive to cap-
ture audit quality and efficiency performance.
Previous Literature and Hypotheses
Literature review
Historically, audit quality has been defined as the ‘joint
probability that a given auditor will both be able to
detect a breach in a client’s accounting system and
report the breach’ (DeAngelo 1981: 186). However,
following recent financial scandals, the binary concept
of audit quality may be considered insufficient. DeFond
and Zhang (2014: 281) suggest a modern definition of
audit quality as ‘assurance that the financial statements
faithfully reflect the firm’s underlying economics, con-
ditioned on its financial reporting system and innate
characteristics’, suggesting that specific characteristics
such as income generation may influence future audit
quality debates. DeAngelo’s (1981) audit quality defi-
nition suggests that an audit has two outcomes based
on sufficient/insufficient audit effort to detect audit
failures. Defond and Zhang (2014) imply that based
on innate characteristics, such as firm efficiency, incre-
mental audit effort can increase/decrease audit quality.
Thus, we are interested in how firm income-generating
processes are perceived by both market participants
and audit firms. It is established that more efficient
firms enjoy various comparative advantages relative to
peers (Demsetz 1973; McWilliams and Smart 1993).
The literature also suggests that market participants
are interested in client performance ‘authenticity’ to
ascertain whether business operations are truly reflected
in financial statements. Thus, based on the incentives of
various groups, additional audit effort can be consid-
ered a potential signal for increased audit quality that
legitimises a firm’s efficiency performance.
Simunic’s (1980) audit demand theory suggests that
clients have the potential to request audit services for
two reasons. First, agency theory suggests that because
the incentives of shareholders and managers may not
always be aligned, managers may take actions to act
in their own self-interest (Jensen and Meckling 1976;
Watts and Zimmerman 1983). However, an audit of suf-
ficient quality can reduce the potential for managers to
act in their own self-interest at the expense of share-
holders (Caramanis and Lennox 2008; Lobo and Zhao
2013; Lee et al. 2014). Thus, to reduce agency con-
flicts, additional auditor scrutiny is likely requested by
shareholders to enhance monitoring as assurance that
financial reporting quality is robust and financial state-
ments demonstrate a true and fair view of the business.
Second, management can demand additional audit ser-
vices to enhance their knowledge about a firm’s internal
operations to improve ‘audit management’ (Bailey et al.
2012). Defond and Zhang (2014) suggest that additional
audit effort can be demanded internally to provide as-
surance that accounting systems are accurate for deci-
sion making, ‘adding value’ to the audit process. As an
extension, there is the potential that additional account-
ing effort in hours may be considered as a form of sig-
nalling in developing countries to show that business
systems are robust. Thus, as Esplin et al. (2018) suggest,
audit effort can be demanded by both internal stake-
holders and external stakeholders.
Based on audit supply theory (Simunic 1980), audit
effort can be limited based on an auditor’s strategy
to reduce reputational and litigation risk. Following
the audit failure of one of KPMG’s large clients in
Germany, KPMG lost business and its remaining clients
experienced declining share prices (Weber et al. 2008).
In Japan, following the audit failure of a PwC affiliate,
PwC lost clients due to reputational damage (Skinner
and Srinivasan 2012). As a result of the infamous Enron
scandal, Andersen’s clients experienced a significant
market decline (Cahan et al. 2009). The above studies
suggest that: i) an audit firm’s brand value is subject
to upside performance potential and downside risk;
ii) audit fees (input) influence market participants’
perceived audit quality (outputs); and iii) based on
supply theory, an audit firm’s fees increase with client
risk. Various studies show that higher audit fees are
demanded by audit firms based on audit risk proxies
including industry and competition risk (Simunic and
Stein 1996; Cahan et al. 2008), earnings management
(Gul et al. 2003; Abbott et al. 2006), weak internal
control (Hogan and Wilkins 2008) and unethical busi-
ness practices (Lyon and Maher 2005). Furthermore,
audit fees have been shown to be higher when an audit
firm’s perception about a client’s audit risk increases
(Bell et al. 2001; Bedard and Johnstone 2004; Lyon and
Maher 2005; Schelleman and Knechel 2010; Bryan and
Mason 2016). However, the assumption that audit fees
are a proxy for risk per se is not accepted in the literature
because additional audit effort can signal the incentive
of clients to demand additional audit testing to enhance
audit quality (Ghafran and O’Sullivan 2017). Khan
et al. (2015) posit that additional audit fees demonstrate
clients request additional audit services to improve
audit systems. Gul and Goodwin (2010) find that
clients that have undergone a credit rating reduction
request additional audit effort to reduce the potential
of another decrease. Thus, the literature shows that the
true relationship between audit quality (risk) and audit
fees is an ongoing debate with the majority of studies
considering audit fees to capture an audit risk premium.
Likewise, the relationship between audit hours and
firm risk is not established in the literature. Simunic
(1980) shows that audit effort increases with firm risk,
suggesting that audit hours are demanded by audit
© 2020 The Authors. Australian Accounting Review published by
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firms to reduce business threats. Deis and Giroux
(1992) report that additional audit hours have a neg-
ative influence on brand value. Their results suggest
that additional audit effort is imposed onto clients.
Using a sample of government firms, O’Keefe et al.
(1994) demonstrate that audit effort (hours) increases
with various client firm risk proxies which include
firm-level complexity and client size. On the other
hand, more recent studies show that there is a negative
association between audit hours and firm risk. Cara-
manis and Lennox (2008) demonstrate that firms that
secure higher levels of audit effort relative to peers are
less likely to engage in earnings management. There
is evidence that firm owners request different levels
of audit effort based on specific incentives. Knechel
el al. (2008) demonstrate that client firms with larger
international ownership demand additional audit hours
relative to firms that are owned by management. The
results show that management has an incentive to
reduce audit hours compared to international investors
who demand additional monitoring to reduce agency
problems. The relation between audit hours and audit
risk is also mixed in South Korea. Kang et al. (2014)
suggest that auditors spend more time and effort fo-
cusing on high-risk engagements, whilst a Korean study
by Jung (2016) reports that audit hours reduce firm
risk. Their study shows that firms that secure additional
audit effort benefit from lower capital costs, suggesting
that additional audit effort can be considered a form of
signalling to market participants. However, whilst the
audit (effort) hour literature is somewhat mixed, audit
hours are a direct audit effort input because they equate
to the number of tests completed by an audit firm. Audit
fees on the other hand can be considered a less robust
measure of audit effort because audit fees include a
risk premium which is an indirect measure of audit
effort/quality.
Thus, a question emerges. Can audit hours be influ-
enced by firm efficiency, a proxy for firm performance?
Efficiency studies are divided into two estimation
methods, relative efficiency and absolute efficiency.
Absolute efficiency is calculated using accounting book
value ratios of output divided by inputs including
ROA, earnings divided by assets and the asset turnover
ratio (ATO). The productivity literature establishes a
positive relation between financial performance and
absolute firm efficiency (Ou and Penman 1989; Lev
and Thiagarajan 1993; Abarbanell and Bushee 1997;
Soliman 2008). However, recently, critics of absolute
efficiency studies (estimation) suggest it is a less infor-
mative measure of performance compared to relative
efficiency (Combs et al. 2005; Crook et al. 2008). Re-
cent studies also demonstrate a positive relationship
between financial performance and relative efficiency
using frontier analysis (Alam and Sickles 1998; Greene
and Segal 2004; Cummins et al. 2010). Baik et al. (2013)
conduct a study to capture whether changes in oper-
ational efficiency using both absolute efficiency and
relative efficiency can predict firm performance. The
study demonstrates that a positive relationship exists
between relative efficiency and firm performance after
controlling for absolute efficiency, suggesting that both
relative efficiency and book value efficiency may be
considered different organisational phenomena. ROA
is a commonly used audit risk variable in audit effort
studies to demonstrate lower audit and business risk.
However, because relative efficiency is shown to be an
informative but different measure of firm performance
compared to absolute efficiency in previous studies (De-
merjian et al. 2012; Frijns et al. 2012), we are interested
to capture if the directional relationship is consistent or
different.
Relative efficiency is considered a more informative
measure of efficiency performance in the literature for
two reasons. First, relative efficiency is informative be-
cause it measures the relative performance of each firm
known as a decision-making unit (DMU) within a spe-
cific industry and year using well-designed parameters.
For each DMU, the optimum aggregate ratio of lim-
ited given resources and costs (inputs) that are under
the direct control of management to generate sales (out-
put) can be identified. Based on the efficiency frontier
horizon, the most efficient aggregate of resource utili-
sation can be captured by the efficiency frontier hori-
zon; deviations from this resource utilisation aggregate
can be captured as ‘relative inefficiency’. Thus, from
the perspective of market participants, relative efficiency
can be considered a genuine measure of efficiency per-
formance because it captures how effectively managers
have generated sales utilising selling general and admin
costs (SGA), plant, property and equipment (PPE) and
cost of goods sold (COGS) amongst other inputs rel-
ative to peers. Absolute efficiency does not differenti-
ate. Absolute efficiency is a simple accounting ratio that
includes all asset values listed on financial statements
whether they are utilised to generate sales or not. Sec-
ond, compared to relative efficiency, absolute efficiency
ignores the inputs required to generate sales in different
industries. For ease of computation, ROA simply divides
earnings with assets. Whilst this value is simple to inter-
pret, it is not comparable in different industries such as
mining, merchandising or service industries. However,
relative efficiency captures the efficiency of each firm
within an industry using resources and costs specific
to the industry, and then with the market as a whole.
Based on evidence that credit rating agencies reward
firms with higher relative efficiency (not absolute effi-
ciency) with higher credit ratings (Mali and Lim 2019),
we conjecture that market participants are aware of the
difference of book value (absolute) efficiency and rela-
tive firm efficiency, and have the sophistication to cap-
ture both types of efficiency.
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South Korean audit infrastructure
The South Korean sample is unique because the audit
profession has experimented with numerous audit
policies to improve audit and earnings quality. In
1999, following the 1997 financial crisis, one of South
Korea’s largest firms, Daewoo, filed for bankruptcy
as a result of window dressing. During 2000–2001,
successive bankruptcies of Korean conglomerates in-
creased public demand for additional auditor scrutiny.
Therefore, Korean audit legislators suggested the imple-
mentation of two policies. In 2001, the South Korean
Government mandated that the number of completed
audit hours/audit engagement must be transparent
and recorded on financial statements. In 2003, the
Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation Rule (MAFR) was
implemented and became effective in 2006. MAFR was
introduced based on the entrenchment hypothesis,
suggesting that familiarity between audit firms and
clients reduces earnings quality. MAFR required clients
to rotate audit firms every six years. However, the
policy was considered ineffective and ceased in 2011
when Korea adopted International Financial Reporting
Standards (IFRS) (Choi et al. 2017; Mali and Lim 2018).
The 2001 audit effort policy that requires all listed
firms to record audit hours (and fees) received per fis-
cal year on annual reports is still practiced. Korean mar-
ket participants may therefore perceive audit effort dif-
ferently to market participants where the audit pol-
icy does not exist. For example: i) in Anglo-American
economies, audit information can be communicated
relatively more cheaply using audit disclosures. How-
ever, audit disclosure information has been criticised
for being limited (IFRS 2017). Second, because audit
hour information is known to market participants in
South Korea, audit hours (input) can be considered a di-
rect and felicitous measure of audit/financial reporting
quality (output). The alternative audit quality signalling
strategy using audit disclosures could be considered sec-
ondary information and would incur additional cost in
South Korea. Third, in South Korea, increasing compe-
tition amongst audit firms has driven down audit fees
(Kwon et al. 2014; Park and Lee 2008). Therefore, be-
cause the audit market is highly competitive and audit
information is available, it is likely that clients have the
power to secure audit effort based on the incentives of
various stakeholders. We discuss the incentives of vari-
ous stakeholders based on relative efficiency in our hy-
pothesis development section below.
Hypotheses
Audit supply theory suggests that audit firms have an
incentive to mitigate reputational damage and litigation
risk, and therefore demand a fee premium based on a
client’s audit risk (Simunic and Stein 1996; Bell et al.
2001; Gul et al. 2003; Bedard and Johnstone 2004; Lyon
and Maher 2005; Abbott et al. 2006; Cahan et al. 2008;
Hogan and Wilkins 2008; Schelleman and Knechel
2010; Bryan and Mason 2016). Audit fee studies suggest
that audit firms control the supply of audit services,
implying that audit effort and audit fees are equivalent.
However, as Enron and similar cases show, audit fees
can be collected by audit firms for consulting without
the completion of audit tests (effort). Thus, audit fees
can be considered a direct driver of audit risk, but an in-
direct driver of audit effort/quality. On the other hand,
audit demand theory implies that audit effort in hours
is required by clients to ‘add value’ (Simunic 1980;
DeFond and Zhang 2014). From a demand perspective,
audit hours can be considered a direct input of audit
quality because audit hours represent the incremental
levels of system, control and substantive tests conducted
by an audit team. In the literature, there is evidence that
audit hours can reduce earnings management (Carama-
nis and Lennox 2008) and reduce the risk perceptions
of market participants (Jung 2016); however, an associ-
ation between audit hours and efficiency performance
has not been captured empirically.
We interpret that the association between audit hours
and efficiency performance is not recorded in the litera-
ture for the following reasons. First, audit quality studies
are underpinned by DeAngelo’s (1981) assertion that
the purpose of an audit is to detect breaches in a client’s
financial reporting. Moreover, ‘audit equilibrium’ im-
plies that auditors have an incentive to transfer costs
from low-risk clients to high-risk clients (Balachandran
and Ramakrishnan 1987). Audit fee studies therefore
imply that audit firms control every aspect of audit
planning and that audit fees are an indicator of audit
risk, not audit quality. Thus, audit fee (effort) studies
associate audit effort with the incentives of audit firms
when client firms have high levels of audit/business risk,
but ignore the audit demands of clients with higher
levels of efficiency performance. Second, whilst audit
fee information is available to most market participants,
audit hour information is not recorded on annual re-
ports on a comparable, structured and consistent basis
internationally. Therefore, the relationship between
audit hours/quality and efficiency performance can
only be recorded in a handful of countries. Third,
audit effort would only be demanded in value-adding
situations to demonstrate robust audit and financial
reporting quality.
Based on the incentives of various stakeholders, the
explanations for a positive association between audit
hour and relative efficiency are outlined in Figure 1.
First, relative efficiency is an empirical measurement of
the effectiveness of managers to maximise output (sales)
from inputs that are directly under the control of man-
agement including PPE, SGA and goodwill amongst
© 2020 The Authors. Australian Accounting Review published by
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Figure 1 Relative efficiency and audit effort
others (given resources and costs) (Demerjian et al.
2012, 2017; Frijns et al. 2012). Audit effort in hours can
be perceived by market participants as enhancing audit
quality. Thus, both audit hours and relative efficiency
can be considered a measure of organisational quality.
Lim and Mali (2018) demonstrate that relative efficiency
is a signal of managerial effectiveness that influences a
market participant’s propensity to invest/disinvest in a
firm. The study also suggests that investors monitor rel-
ative efficiency and retain investments in more efficient
firms causing higher levels of uncertainty in less efficient
firms. If relative efficiency reduces uncertainty and re-
duces disinvestment, management is likely to have an
incentive to demonstrate that robust efficiency perfor-
mance was achieved in an organisation with high fi-
nancial reporting and audit quality. Thus, as efficiency
performance increases, audit effort (input) is likely re-
quired to enhance audit quality (output) to signal that
efficiency performance is genuine. On the other hand,
firms with low levels of relative efficiency have no incen-
tive to request additional external audit scrutiny. This
relationship would be captured empirically as a pos-
itive association between relative efficiency and audit
hours.
Second, we hypothesise that as relative efficiency
increases, shareholders will demand higher levels of
audit hours. Agency theory implies that information
asymmetry will cause groups to take action to protect
their own self-interest (Watts and Zimmerman 1983).
Dopuch et al. (1986) surmise that the perception of
an agency problem, not its existence, will cause groups
to take action to reduce information asymmetry. In a
situation in which a firm has high levels of relative effi-
ciency, but low audit quality, shareholders may perceive
that managers can expropriate wealth from sharehold-
ers. Therefore, because audit effort is shown to improve
governance and mitigate agency problems (Lobo and
Zhao 2013; Lee et al. 2014), the shareholders of high-
performing client firms can consider audit effort as a
small financial outgoing to ensure financial resources
are not misused or misappropriated. The managers of
high-performing firms are likely to accept the audit
effort request of shareholders to reduce objections to
performance-related benefits. Third, as suggested by
Esplin et al. (2018) creditors, suppliers and other equity
stakeholders require assurances that financial reporting
quality is accurate to set credit terms. Therefore, we
conjecture that management will accommodate the
audit quality demands of external stakeholders. Taken
together, we hypothesise that audit firms as a service
provider would accommodate the audit requirements of
client firms with higher efficiency. Based on the above,
we develop the following hypothesis:
H1: Firms with higher relative efficiency demand higher
audit effort in hours relative to inefficient peers.
Research Design
Variable definition
Our model is developed by borrowing from both Fri-
jns et al. (2012) and Demerjian et al. (2012). However,
our model estimates relative efficiency as operational
performance or sales generated by only the inputs that
6 Australian Accounting Review © 2020 The Authors. Australian Accounting Review published by
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are directly under the control of management. Relative
efficiency using frontier analysis can be estimated using
data envelopment analysis (DEA), a non-parametric ap-
proach. Our DEA efficiency ratio is listed in equation
(1). Sales, the numerator, is the value of gross sales. The
denominators in equation (1) are the combination of
‘given resources’ and ‘costs’ that are firm inputs sub-
ject to management’s discretion. ‘Given resources’ are a
firm’s PPE, operating lease, other intangibles and good-
will. Costs are a combination of cost of goods sold and
selling general and admin expenses. All these values are
taken from the financial statements.
maxuθ = u1Sales
u1GivenResources + u2Cost s (1)
where,
Sales (output): Gross sales
Given resources: PPE + operating lease + goodwill +
other intangibles
Costs: Cost of goods sold + SGA
PPE: Net PPE
Operating lease: Net operating lease
Goodwill: Purchased goodwill
In equation (1), we illustrate output (sales) divided
by inputs (costs and given resources). In equation (2)
x represents sales and y(s) represent given resources and
costs; however, we add a weighting structure u and v to
optimise the DEA procedure. To estimate equation (2),
first, a DMU is divided into its specific industry to mea-
sure the effectiveness of a firm’s innate business char-
acteristics based on its income-generating process. Di-
viding DMUs into industries allows us to compare like
with like. Next, we maximise the values of equation (2)
for each DMU by varying the weights of both u and v
using the DEA Malmquist index. By varying the values
of u and v for each DMU, it is possible to determine
the weights of equation (2) so that the efficiency ratio
of each DMU is maximised. Third, the derived optimal
values of u and v are multiplied by output (numera-
tor) and inputs (denominator) to estimate our efficiency
score for each individual DMU. Using this approach, it
is possible to develop a relative measure to derive an ef-
ficiency score for each firm independently within a spe-
cific year and industry. Relative efficiency is estimated
for each DMU by industry and year because economic
factors, government regulation amongst market factors
will be different for DMUs and industries in a specific
year. However, based on an individual efficiency score
in each industry and year, it is possible to discover rela-
tive efficiency as it relates to the most efficient firm that
is situated on the optimal efficiency frontier horizon for
each firm-year.
Finally, we scale the efficiency scores so that they are
comparable across various industries. This careful de-
composition is required because the relatively most ef-
ficient firm in different industries can be considered.
Relative efficiency estimates an optimal efficiency vec-
tor for a specific industry, and then divides the values
with the most efficient score to provide a value of zero
to one, with one reflecting the optimal ordinal value of
relative efficiency. Therefore, relative efficiency enables
a comparison of all firms regardless of industry, miti-
gating benchmarking problems defined in previous lit-
erature (Barr and Siems 1997; Leverty and Grace 2012).
If we consider that the maximum efficiency value of 15
represents the maximum value for a mining firm, and
21 for a merchandising firm, the scaled values of both
would be one (15/15 and 21/21). Furthermore, a firm
in a mining industry with an efficiency score of (7/15
= ) 0.467 can be compared with an electronics firm
and (13/21 = ) 0.619 for modelling purposes. This scal-
ing process allows us to estimate efficiency based on an
ordinal ranking to compare efficiency scores of DMUs
within an industry compared to the market. We then re-
run our model for each year and combine our sample,
which allows us to compare each firm’s efficiency in rel-
ative terms.
∑ s
i = 1 uiyik∑m
j = 1 υjxjk
k = 1, . . . , n. (2)
In its most simple implementation, DEA identifies the
observation with the highest ratio of sales (output) to
the resources and costs that are under the control of
management (input) as an efficiency observation (here
the frontier is a single point from the positive orthant in
R1). Each observation is assigned a value of zero to one
on the efficiency scale. For example, the resource allo-
cation (SGA, for example) of the most efficient firm is
captured. This is then compared with the most efficient
utilisation of resource (PPE, for example) of the second
most efficient firm. The estimation of efficiency for each
resource for each DMU in the industry is measured to
capture the most effective utilisation of resources as an
efficiency frontier horizon. The remaining observations
would be scaled relative to the efficient observation from
R1 into the closed interval [0, 1]. Thus, DEA can be con-
sidered an aggregate firm measure to demonstrate how
managers transform aggregate costs/resources (inputs)
into revenues (outputs).
In equation (3), our dependent variable, audit hours,
a proxy for audit effort is estimated as the natural loga-
rithm of audit hours. As explained in our hypothesis, we
conjecture a positive relationship between relative effi-
ciency and audit effort. Next, we include determinants
and independent variables that influence audit hours
based on previous studies (O’Keefe et al. 1994; Jung
2016). The estimation of our independent variables and
determinant categorisation are listed in Table 1. To es-
timate the first determinant ‘size’, we estimate firm size
© 2020 The Authors. Australian Accounting Review published by
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Table 1 Variable definitions
Dependent variable Definition
Audit effort Natural logarithm of audit hours
Variables of interest




Firm size(Size) Natural logarithm of total assets
Investment size(Invested_Capital) Average invested capital/total assets
Auditor size(Big4) A dummy variable that takes the value one if an
auditor is Big 4, and zero otherwise
2. Business risk
Indebtedness(Lev) Debt ratio (=total liabilities/total assets)
Financial risk(Loss) A dummy variable that takes the value one if a
firm’s net income is negative, and zero
otherwise
Liquidity risk(Current_Debt) Current debt ratio (=current liabilities/current
assets)
3. Performance/Complexity
Efficiency performance(ROA) Absolute efficiency, return on assets (net
income/total assets)
Firm value(Tobin_Q) Tobin’s Q calculated using Chung and Pruitt
(1994)
Firm experience(Age) Firm age
4. Ownership structure
Bigown Biggest shareholder’s share holdings (%)
Fore Foreign investors’ share holdings (%)
5. Fixed effect
ID Industry fixed effect
YD Year fixed effect
as the natural logarithm of a firm’s total assets. Auditor
size is proxied by a dummy variable that takes the value
one if a client firm is audited by a Big 4 firm, and zero
otherwise. Investment size is estimated as average in-
vested capital/total assets and average invested capital is
estimated in equation (4). We expect a positive relation
between audit effort and all our ‘size’ variables because
larger and more complex firms are shown to require
additional audit hours in previous studies (Brinn et al.
1994). Next, we proxy for ‘business risk’ using indebted-
ness, financial risk (loss) and liquidity risk (as estimated
in Table 1). We expect that audit effort will increase with
all business risk proxies based on audit supply theory
(Simunic 1980). We expect a positive relation between
Tobin Q and audit hours because firms with higher
market-to-book value are likely to require more audit
effort to legitimise their market position. We expect to
find a positive relation between firm experience/age and
audit hours because older firms are likely to be more
complex. Next, we proxy firm ownership structure. We
expect a positive relation between foreign ownership
and audit hours consistent with foreign owners de-
manding higher governance in a Korean setting (Lim
and Mali 2020). We would expect a negative relation-
ship between the percentage shareholding of the largest
domestic shareholder and audit hours because as the
power of the largest shareholder increases, it is likely that
the largest shareholder will take an active role in firm
monitoring.
Finally, we control for absolute efficiency. Based on
audit supply theory, firms with higher ROA are consid-
ered less risky by audit firms compared to firms with
lower ROA. We conjecture a negative relation is likely to
exist between audit effort in hours and absolute firm ef-
ficiency based on previous studies that use ROA to con-
trol for audit risk. A positive relationship between rela-
tive efficiency and audit hours, and a negative relation-
ship between absolute efficiency and audit hours would
provide evidence that relative efficiency and absolute ef-
ficiency must be considered as different forms of effi-
ciency by market participants. We include industry and
year dummy variables to control for year and industry
effects because audit effort can vary due to the imple-
mentation of audit policies (Carson et al. 2014).
AuditE f fort i,t = β1 RelativeE f fi i,t + β2Sizei,t
+ β3InvestedCapital i,t + β4Big4i,t
+ β5Levi,t + β6Lossi,t +β7Current Debt i,t
+ β8ROAi,t + β9TobinQi,t + β10Agei,t
+ β11BigOwni,t + β12Forei,t
+ it ID + Y D + εi,t (3)
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Table 2 Sample selection
Panel A: Firm efficiency and audit hour sample 2002–2014
Potential sample 15 200
Excluding firms with no financial data available (4085)
Final sample 11 115






2002 755 308.17 2009 875 1039.14
2003 801 703.06 2010 887 1151.25
2004 810 876.39 2011 888 1413.88
2005 831 933.91 2012 897 1437.07
2006 849 1024.33 2013 897 1553.73
2007 857 1059.59 2014 909 1601.05
2008 859 1078.96 Total 11 115 1107.55
Total 11 115






2002 754 0.46 2009 874 0.60
2003 800 0.62 2010 886 0.77
2004 809 0.56 2011 887 0.73
2005 830 0.44 2012 896 0.72
2006 848 0.54 2013 896 0.74
2007 856 0.67 2014 908 0.77
2008 858 0.69 Total 11 102 0.65
Average invested capital = AVGCA + AVGNPPE
+ AVGOBA + AVGNIBD(4)
where,
AVGCA: Average current asset [ = (Beginning current
assets + Ending current assets)/2]
AVGNPPT: Average net property, plant and equipment
[ = (Beginning net PPE + Ending net PPE)/2]
AVGOBA: Average other business assets [ = (Beginning
OBA + Ending OBA)/2]
AVGNIBD: Average non-interest-bearing debts [ = (Be-
ginning NIBD + Ending NIBD)/2]
Sample
In Table 2, Panel A, we provide details of our sam-
ple selection process. The 2002–2014 sample period is
selected because the Korean economy had recovered
from the 1997 Asian financial crisis in 2002 and au-
dit effort information is available. All firm variables
are downloaded from two Korean databases, KISS-Value
and TS2000; these Korean databases can be considered
equivalent to Osiris or Compustat. The values are then
merged and the values for financial firms are deleted
leaving an initial panel sample of 15,200 firm-year ob-
servations after excluding financial firms. We exclude an
additional 4,085 observations because of financial data
being unavailable (in our panel), leaving a final sample
of 11,115. In Table 2, Panel B, we illustrate the mean lev-
els of audit hours from 2002 to 2014. Audit hours have
increased significantly from 2002 to 2006 and have con-
tinued to increase to 2014. In Panel C, the yearly aver-
age relative efficiency of all firms from 2002 to 2014 is
listed. Overall, relative efficiency increases over the sam-
ple period excluding 2005–2009, a period in which the
world economy was in decline (United Nations 2005).
We would expect an increase in relative efficiency given




In Table 3, we perform tests comparing the business and
financial fundamentals of clients audited by Big 4/non-
Big 4 firms. Column 4 provides the details of mean (me-
dian) difference tests. We find that client firms that are
audited by Big 4 auditors are larger, have higher invest-
ment capital, leverage, profitability, are older and have
higher foreign ownership and large shareholders com-
pared to client firms that are not audited by Big 4 firms.
Furthermore, we find that firms that are audited by Big
4 auditors have lower levels of short-term debt and are
less likely to make a financial loss. However, the relative
efficiency of Big 4 and non-Big 4 clients is indifferent,
showing that client firms of various characteristics can
achieve high relative efficiency. We find that clients au-
dited by Big 4/non-Big 4 auditors have statistically in-
different Tobin Q values. The results suggest that mar-
ket confidence is indifferent based on the preference of
clients to select a Big 4 or a non-Big 4 audit firm. We sur-
mise that auditor size has no significant effect on firm
valuation.
In Table 4, we list our Pearson correlation results.
Consistent with our expectation, audit hours increase
with relative efficiency (0.07). We find a weak negative
correlation between ROA and audit hours (–0.01, 10%
significance level). The results suggest that whilst rela-
tive efficiency increases with audit effort, the relation-
ship between audit effort and absolute efficiency is weak.
Interestingly, the relationship between audit hours and
the increasing share ownership of the largest domestic
shareholder is statistically significantly negative (–0.03)
whilst the relationship is statistically significantly posi-
tive for foreign owners (0.25). We interpret that domes-
tic shareholders demand lower levels of audit effort as
a result of local knowledge and potentially a closer re-
lationship with management based on increasing share
ownership. Larger international owners are likely to
© 2020 The Authors. Australian Accounting Review published by
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Table 4 Pearson correlations
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Audit hour 1
2. Relative_Effi 0.07*** 1
3. Size 0.51*** 0.01 1
4. Invested_Capital 0.20*** -0.11*** 0.22*** 1
5. Big4 0.32*** -0.01 0.38*** 0.08*** 1
6. Lev 0.06*** -0.01 0.12*** -0.17*** 0.04*** 1
7. Loss −0.01 −0.10*** −0.18*** 0.03*** −0.08*** 0.22*** 1
8. Current_Debt −0.09*** 0.11*** −0.23*** −0.20*** −0.06*** 0.00 0.00
9. ROA −0.01* 0.18*** 0.17*** −0.11*** 0.07*** −0.21*** −0.54***
10. Tobin_Q 0.05*** 0.05*** −0.09*** 0.04*** 0.01 −0.28*** 0.01
11. Age 0.27*** −0.00 0.46*** 0.17*** 0.13*** 0.04*** −0.09***
12. BigOwn −0.03*** 0.05*** 0.074*** 0.03*** 0.066*** −0.07*** −0.21***
13. Fore 0.25*** −0.02*** 0.44*** 0.08*** 0.24*** -0.12*** −0.14***
8 9 10 11 12 13
8. Current_Debt 1
9. ROA 0.06*** 1
10. Tobin_Q 0.01 0.08*** 1
11. Age −0.17*** −0.01 −0.17*** 1
12. BigOwn −0.02** 0.16*** −0.14*** 0.11*** 1
13. Fore −0.06*** 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.12*** −0.03*** 1
*, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively.
See Table 1 for variable definitions.
Table 5 Relative efficiency and audit effort Model:
Audit_Efforti,t = β1Relative_Effii,t + β2Sizei,t + β3Invested_Capitali,t
+ β4Big4i,t + β5Levi,t + β6Lossi,t + β7Current_Debti,t + β8ROAi,t
+ β9Tobin_Qi,t + β10Agei,t + β11BigOwni,t + β12Forei,t + ID+YD+ εi,t
Pred. sign Parameter estimate t-statistic
Intercept +/− −1.34*** −7.81
Relative_Effi + 0.33*** 11.37
Size + 0.36*** 39.34
Invested_Capital + 0.55*** 10.09
Big4 + 0.36*** 17.34
Lev + 0.08* 1.74
Loss + 0.08*** 2.90
Current_Debt + 0.30*** 5.81
ROA - −1.10*** −8.51
Tobin_Q + 0.24*** 10.59
Age + 0.01*** 6.07
BigOwn - −0.39*** −6.71






*, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively.
See Table 1 for variable definitions.
demand higher levels of audit effort as a form of mon-
itoring to improve governance. Loss has no significant
association with audit effort, suggesting that a financial
loss does not have a relationship with audit hours, with-
out controlling for the firm risk/performance determi-
nants that are likely to have led to a financial loss. All
other variables show the predicted signs and are statisti-
cally significant at the 1% level.
Multivariate analysis
In Table 5, we provide details of our main analysis.
We conduct OLS regressions to establish the relation-
ship between our dependent variable audit hours (au-
dit effort) and relative efficiency estimated using DEA.
We find a highly statistically significantly positive rela-
tion between relative efficiency and audit hours (0.33,
© 2020 The Authors. Australian Accounting Review published by
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t-value 11.37). The results imply that an increase in rel-
ative firm efficiency by one unit is associated with a
0.33 increase in audit hours. Because relative firm effi-
ciency is a value of zero to one, it is possible to inter-
pret the relative efficiency value as a percentage from
zero to 100%. Moreover, because we use the natural log-
arithm of audit hours, our results can be interpreted as
follows. The most efficient firm with a relative efficiency
score of one (100% relative efficiency) requests 33%
more audit effort compared to the least efficient firm
with a relative efficiency score of zero (0%). If a firm is
77% efficient compared to the most efficient firm (firm
with an efficiency ratio of one), this firm would require
25.41% (0.77*0.33) additional audit effort based on in-
creasing efficiency. Therefore, whilst it may possible that
the most efficient firms have higher risk (Nguyen and
Swanson 2009), our results imply that confident man-
agement with robust business operations requires ad-
ditional audit effort with increasing relative firm effi-
ciency. This evidence allows us to accept our hypothesis.
Based on audit demand theory, our results can be in-
terpreted as management having an incentive to signal
relative efficiency performance to secure better terms
from suppliers and capital providers; and to reduce the
opposition to performance-related remuneration as a
result of additional audit hours signalling higher audit
quality and financial reporting quality to market partic-
ipants. We also interpret that shareholders request ad-
ditional audit effort to minimise agency problems. On
the other hand, the stakeholders of relatively inefficient
firms would not have a similar incentive to signal that
financial reporting is robust using audit effort because it
would be considered an unnecessary expense for a rela-
tively poorly performing organisation.
Next, we include details about the relationship be-
tween absolute efficiency (ROA) and audit effort. We
find that the relationship between absolute efficiency is
negative (–1.10, t-value –8.51). We interpret that based
on absolute efficiency being estimated as a simple book
value ratio, audit firms have few incentives to use valu-
able resources to scrutinise firms with high levels of
ROA. The results also show that client firms have few in-
centives to demand additional audit effort to signal high
levels of absolute efficiency. Baik et al. (2013) is one of
the first studies to interpret that relative efficiency and
absolute efficiency may be considered as different effi-
ciency performance measurements and real-world phe-
nomena. Our results show that the relationship between
relative efficiency and audit hours is different compared
to absolute efficiency and audit hours. To the best of our
knowledge, we are the very first to demonstrate that rel-
ative efficiency and absolute efficiency can be captured
as explicitly different forms of efficiency performance.
Firm size (0.36, t-value 39.34), investment capital (0.55,
t-value 10.09) and firm age (0.01, t-value 6.07) increase
with audit hours, suggesting audit effort increases with
business complexity. We also find that firms with higher
risk require higher audit effort based on leverage (0.08,
t-value 1.74), short-term debt (0.30, t-value 5.81) and
loss-making firms (0.08, t-value 2.90). We find a posi-
tive relationship between audit hours and Big 4 auditors
(0.36, t-value 17.34). The results suggest that clients may
perceive that Big 4 audit firms may be ‘value adding’ for
signalling purposes. Our ownership structure measures
BigOwn (–0.39, t-value –6.71) and Fore (0.18, t-value
2.01) also show consistent results with our descriptive
statistics.
Additional Analysis
Audit fees and audit expertise
Nam (2018) shows that following the adoption of IFRS
in South Korea, audit hours have increased at a higher
rate compared to audit fees, suggesting that audit hours
are associated with efforts to improve audit quality. If
a positive association between audit hours and rela-
tive efficiency can be perceived as client firms secur-
ing additional audit effort for signalling purposes, there
should be no association between relative efficiency and
a fee (per hour) premium. Thus, we estimate the re-
lationship between i) audit fees with relative efficiency
and ii) audit expertise (fee per hour) with relative ef-
ficiency. Audit fees in the literature are considered to
increase with audit risk. However, previous studies are
unable to disentangle audit fees and hours because of
data unavailability. Thus, in previous studies audit effort
(fees/hours) may be misinterpreted as risk, not audit ef-
fort to enhance audit quality. Audit fee per hour will de-
pend on the service levels demanded by client firms and
the incentives of audit firms to reduce business and au-
dit risk. Lower levels of audit fee per hour are a result
of junior members of staff being allocated to an audit
assignment. Higher levels of fee per hour would be a re-
sult of audit partners or other senior auditors working
on an audit to mitigate risk. In Table 6, our results show
that audit fees increase with relative efficiency (0.05, t-
value 3.35). This result is expected because audit hours
and fees are likely to be linked. However, we find an in-
significant relationship between audit fees per hour and
relative efficiency. We interpret that an insignificant re-
lationship between audit fees per hour and relative ef-
ficiency shows that audit firms do not consider relative
efficiency to be a form of business/audit risk based on
a risk premium basis (after controlling for our firm risk
and performance proxies that show the expected sign).
Thus, the levels of audit services (experience) provided
by junior members of staff, senior auditors and partners
are not influenced by relative efficiency. Taken together,
the results suggest that additional audit effort is more
likely demanded by client firms as opposed to imparted
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Table 6 Audit fee and fees per hour Model:
Audit_Efforti,t = β1Relative_Effii,t + β2Sizei,t + β3Invested_Capitali,t
+ β4Big4i,t + β5Levi,t + β6Lossi,t + β7Current_Debti,t + β8ROAi,t + β9Tobin_Qi,t
+ β10Agei,t + β11BigOwni,t + β12Forei,t + ID+YD+ εi,t
Pred. sign DV: Audit fee DV: Fee per hour
Intercept +/− 3.39***(45.30) 6.10***(39.57)
Relative_Effi + 0.05***(3.35) 0.03(0.88)
Size + 0.38***(100.15) 0.03***(4.37)
Invested_Capital + 0.08***(3.62) −0.11**(−2.48)
Big4 + 0.11***(13.87) −0.24***(−14.51)
Lev + 0.25***(13.04) 0.07*(1.89)
Loss + 0.06***(6.24) 0.02(1.07)
Current_Debt + 0.16***(7.58) 0.09**(2.35)
ROA − −0.33***(−6.53) 0.17*(1.68)
Tobin_Q + 0.14***(15.01) 0.02(1.25)
Age + −0.00(−0.09) −0.00*(−1.88)
BigOwn − −0.32***(13.52) −0.02(−0.40)
Fore + 0.22***(5.93) −0.02(−0.29)
YD Included Included
ID Included Included
F value 625.20*** 125.82***
Adj. R2 0.6887 0.3682
Obs. 11 062 11 062
Results of statistical estimation amounts in parentheses are t-values. *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively. Refer to
Table 1 for variable definitions.
The dependent variable 1) Audit_Fee is the natural logarithm of audit fees, 2) Fee per hour is computed by natural logarithm of (audit
fees/audit hours).
See Table 1 for variable definitions.
by audit firms to reduce reputational damage and litiga-
tion threats.
Robust tests based on credit ratings
A credit rating1 is considered a tool by market partici-
pants to evaluate a firm’s comparative default risk (Boot
et al. 2006; Kraft 2015). Various studies provide evidence
of a fundamental difference in how financial institu-
tions, including credit-rating agencies, insurance firms
and banks perceive the default risk of investment grade
(IG) and non-investment grade (NIG) firms (Bhojraj
and Sengupta 2003; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006; Kisgen
2006). Therefore, based on evidence that credit-rating
agencies interpret relative efficiency as a default risk
determinant (Mali and Lim 2019), NIG/IG firms are
likely to have different incentives to legitimise relative
efficiency performance. IG firms have an incentive to
protect their rating levels by demonstrating audit qual-
ity. NIG firms are likely to enjoy various advantages
by straddling the investment grade threshold, including
lower borrowing and bond yield rates, better terms from
suppliers, enhanced brand value, access to capital and
investment opportunities that are only available to IG
firms but not NIG firms (Alissa et al. 2013). However,
whether or not it is possible to capture the incentives of
both groups is a question that remains unanswered.
In Table 7, we perform three regressions. In columns
(2) and (3), we run regressions after dividing our
sample into IG and NIG samples. In both regressions
we find that there is a positive relationship between rel-
ative efficiency and audit hours for IG firms (0.28, t-
value 7.81) and NIG firms (0.39, t-value 8.50) regard-
less of sampling, consistent with our previous results.
We also find a negative relation between audit hours
and ROA, consistent with our previous result. Again,
we demonstrate that firms with higher relative efficiency
demand additional audit effort (0.44, t-value 9.59). Our
IG dummy variable shows that IG firms require addi-
tional audit hours compared to NIG firms (0.12, t-value
2.75). Given that IG firms are larger than NIG firms
(Mali and Lim 2019), we interpret that this dummy vari-
able captures that larger firms require additional audit
effort. Our interaction term Effi*IG shows the difference
in the relationship between relative efficiency and audit
hours for IG firms compared to NIG firms. Our results
suggest an incrementally negative relationship between
relative efficiency and audit effort for IG firms, com-
pared to NIG firms (–0.18, t-value –3.19). We interpret
that D to CCC+ firms are more likely to demand audit
effort compared to B– to AAA firms because they have
an incentive to signal robust performance to straddle the
investment grade threshold to benefit from the numer-
ous advantages based on IG status. This evidence again
suggests that audit effort may be used as a signalling
strategy to influence credit ratings. However, in this in-
stance it is also possible to interpret that audit firms im-
pose additional audit hours on to NIG firms with higher
relative efficiency compared to IG firms.
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Table 7 Investment grade vs non-investment grade firms Model:
AuditEffort i,t = β1RelativeEffi i,t + β2IGi,t + β3Effi ∗ IGi,t
+ β4Sizei,t + β5InvestedCapital i,t + β6Big4i,t + β7Levi,t
+ β8Lossi,t + β9CurrentDebt i,t + β10ROAi,t + β11TobinQi,t
+ β12Agei,t + β13BigOwni,t + β14Forei,t + ID+YD
+ εi,tAudit_Efforti,t = β1Relative_Effii,t + β2Sizei,t
+ β3Invested_Capitali,t + β4Big4i,t + β5Levi,t + β6Lossi,t
+ β7Current_Debti,t + β8ROAi,t + β9Tobin_Qi,t + β10Agei,t
+ β11BigOwni,t + β12Forei,t + ID+YD+ εi,t
Pred. sign IG vs NIG IG NIG
Intercept +/− −1.41*** −0.89*** −1.99***
(−8.00) (−3.85) (−7.32)






Size + 0.37*** 0.35*** 0.38***
(39.32) (27.82) (27.29)
Invested_Capital + 0.55*** 0.543*** 0.48***
(9.90) (7.23) (5.56)
Big4 + 0.36*** 0.37*** 0.32***
(17.25) (13.99) (10.11)
Lev + 0.08 0.14 0.06
(1.55) (1.55) (0.82)
Loss + 0.08*** −0.02 0.14***
(2.89) (−0.46) (4.17)
Current_Debt + 0.30*** 0.14** 0.558***
(5.74) (2.03) (7.14)
ROA − −1.11*** −1.83*** −0.56***
(−8.53) (−8.95) (−3.15)
Tobin_Q + 0.23*** 0.22*** 0.34***
(10.62) (8.45) (8.01)
Age + 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.01***
(5.96) (2.89) (5.03)
BigOwn − −0.39*** −0.37*** −0.48***
(−6.76) (−4.70) (−5.38)
Fore + 0.18** 0.21* 0.52***
(2.01) (1.87) (2.67)
YD Included Included Included
ID Included Included Included
Chi2 373.10*** 270.12*** 171.94***
Pseudo R2 0.3209 0.3340 0.3106
Obs. 11 069 6476 4593
Results of statistical estimation amounts in parentheses are t-values.
*, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively. Figures in parenthesis indicate t value
See Table 1 for variable definitions.
Robustness test based on market size
We find that efficient NIG firms demand higher levels of
audit hours compared to IG firms. To further demon-
strate that our model is robust, we divide our sample
into groups listed on the Korean KOSPI and KOSDAQ
stock exchanges. If our model is robust, we would ex-
pect that after controlling for size and established mea-
sures of relative efficiency, a firm’s listing on two differ-
ent stock exchanges would not have an incremental ef-
fect on audit effort. In Table 8, we examine the relation
between audit hours and relative efficiency for larger
firms that are listed on KOSPI and smaller KOSDAQ
listed firms. In columns (2) and (3), we again demon-
strate that there is a positive relation between relative
efficiency and audit hours in both KOSPI (0.22, t-value
5.81) and KOSDAQ (0.35, t-value 8.11) samples. In col-
umn (1), we use a dummy variable, market, to separate
KOSPI and KOSDAQ firms. Market takes the value one
if a firm is listed on the larger KOSPI stock exchange,
and zero otherwise. We find that larger KOSPI firms re-
quire fewer audit hours compared to smaller KOSDAQ
firms using a dummy variable approach. However, when
we use an interaction term for relative efficiency with
the market dummy variable to control for size effect, we
find an insignificant association (–0.06, t-value –1.11)
14 Australian Accounting Review © 2020 The Authors. Australian Accounting Review published by
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Table 8 Relatively larger firms vs smaller firmsModel:
Audit_Efforti,t = β1Relative_Effii,t + β2Marketi,t + β3Effi∗Marketi,t
+ β4Sizei,t + β5Invested_Capitali,t + β6Big4i,t + β7Levi,t + β8Lossi,t
+ β9Current_Debti,t + β10ROAi,t + β11Tobin_Qi,t + β12Agei,t
+ β13BigOwni,t + β14Forei,t + ID+YD+ εi,tAudit_Efforti,t
= β1Relative_Effii,t + β2Sizei,t + β3Invested_Capitali,t + β4Big4i,t
+ β5Levi,t + β6Lossi,t + β7Current_Debti,t + β8ROAi,t + β9Tobin_Qi,t
+ β10Agei,t + β11BigOwni,t + β12Forei,t + ID+YD+ εi,t
Pred. sign KOSPI vs KOSDAQ KOSPI KOSDAQ
Intercept +/− −1.81*** −2.62*** −1.14***
(−10.05) (−10.56) (−3.81)






Size + 0.39*** 0.41*** 0.37***
(40.48) (32.53) (21.86)
Invested_Capital + 0.54*** 0.41*** 0.65***
(9.89) (5.23) (8.17)
Big4 0.37*** 0.41*** 0.34***
(18.11) (12.96) (12.58))
Lev + 0.08* 0.14* 0.09
(1.78) (1.79) (1.50)
Loss + 0.07*** 0.11*** 0.01
(2.65) (2.88) (0.37)
Current_Debt + 0.32*** 0.42*** 2.01***
(6.14) (5.39) (2.98)
ROA − −1.14*** −1.15*** −1.17***
(−8.84) (−5.62) (−6.96)
Tobin_Q + 0.22*** 0.48*** 0.09***
(9.98) (11.63) (3.72)
Age + 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01***
(9.33) (8.08) (6.22)
BigOwn − −0.40*** −0.02 −0.75***
(−6.87) (−0.23) (−9.25)
Fore + 0.23** 0.01 0.41***
(2.50) (0.07) (2.49)
YD Included Included Included
ID Included Included Included
Chi2 380.85*** 257.93*** 114.80***
Pseudo R2 0.3254 0.3600 0.1991
Obs. 11 069 5515 5554
Results of statistical estimation amounts in parentheses are t-values.
*, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively.
See Table 1 for variable definitions.
suggesting that the relation between audit effort and rel-
ative efficiency for KOSPI and KOSDAQ listed firms is
indifferent. The results suggest that regardless of mar-
ket listing, we find a consistent positive relationship be-
tween relative efficiency, adding robustness to our pre-
vious findings.
Controlling for time trend, endogeneity and panel
data analysis
We conduct three more additional analyses to add
further robustness to our main findings. First, both
key variables, audit hours and relative firm efficiency
(means), show a general upward trend over the sample
period. In the main analysis, we control for year effects
using a year dummy variable. To rule out spurious re-
sults, we repeat our main analysis but include both year
dummy variables and time trend simultaneously to con-
trol for the exogenous increase in our dependent vari-
able. Specifically, we arrange our data by year and create
a trend variable that is equal to the time index for each
year. Our sample period is from 2002 to 2014, and thus
our time trend equals 1 for 2002, 2 for 2003… 13 for
2014. After controlling for time trend, our reported unt-
abulated results (Relative_effi Coeff 0.03, t-value 2.16)
are consistent with our main analysis. Second, we con-
duct panel data analyses using random GLS regression
© 2020 The Authors. Australian Accounting Review published by
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models, so our regressions consider cross-sectional and
time dependency. Our panel is made up of 911 firms,
and the average observations (years) per group (firm)
is 12.2 (years). Whilst we do not have a perfect panel,
untabulated results show that our analysis using a time-
dependent panel data model is consistent with our main
analysis (Relative_effi Coeff 0.46, z statistics 12.41).
Third, because our results may not be free from
endogeneity, we test endogeneity using the two-stage
least squares models listed below. In the first stage, we
use relative efficiency (endogenous variable) as a depen-
dent variable, and include key determinants of relative
efficiency at time t. The two key independent variables
(instruments) that are highly likely to influence the
dependent variable are: 1) relative efficiency in the pre-
vious year (at time t–1) which is inherently associated
with relative efficiency in the current period (at time
t) and 2) absolute efficiency (ATO = Sales/Assets) at
time t. We also control for variables that are likely to
influence relative efficiency including invested capital,
leverage, ROA and the percentage holding of the largest
shareholder and foreign owners. Our results suggest
that relative efficiency is persistent, largely influenced
by relative efficiency in the previous year (Coeff 0.28,
t-value 31.77) and positively associated with absolute
firm efficiency (ATO ratio) (Coeff 0.28, t-value 13.99).
Moreover, relatively efficient firms are likely to have
higher levels of invested capital (Coeff 0.08, t-value)
and higher firm performance (ROA) (Coeff 0.55, t-
value 20.44). Furthermore, ownership concentration
(BigOwn) (Coeff 0.02, t-value 1.74) and foreign own-
ership (Fore) (Coeff –0.08, t-value –3.73) are positively
and negatively associated with relative efficiency. Lever-
age is found to have no significant association with
relative efficiency (Coeff 0.00, t-value –0.20).
1st stage : Relative_E f fii,t = β1 Relative_E f fii,t−1
+ β2Absolute_E f fii,t + β3Invested_Capital i,t
+ β4Levi,t + β5ROAi,t + β6BigOwni,t
+ β7Forei,t + ID + YD + εi,t
2nd stage : Audit _E f fort i,t = β1 Relative_E f fii,t
+ β2Sizei,t + β3Invested_Capital i,t
+ β4Big4i,t + β5Levi,t + β6Lossi,t
+ β7Current _Debt i,t + β8ROAi,t
+ β9Tobin_Qi,t + β10Agei,t + β11BigOwni,t
+ β12Forei,t + ID + YD + εi,t
Using the first-stage regression, we compute the pre-
dicted value of relative efficiency after controlling for
key determinants. We then repeat the main analysis in
the second regression stage after substituting relative ef-
ficiency with the newly computed predicted value of rel-
ative efficiency, with other control variables being held
constant. Our untabulated results suggest that our main
results remain qualitatively the same (Predicted Rela-
tive_effi Coeff 0.11, t-value 4.21). After conducting 2SLS
analysis, we conduct the Durbin and Wu-Hausman test
where the null hypothesis implies that relative efficiency
is exogenous. The Wooldridge’s score doesn’t reject the
null hypothesis that relative firm efficiency is exogenous
at a conventional significance level (score = 0.25, p =
0.63) suggesting that our main results (the positive re-
lationship between the two main dimensions) are free
from endogeneity.
Conclusion and Discussion
In this study, we find that client firms demand in-
creasing audit hours based on higher levels of relative
efficiency (operational performance). The results sug-
gest that management demands additional audit hours
to demonstrate robust financial reporting, and stake-
holders require additional audit effort to reduce agency
problems. Overall, the results show that increased au-
dit effort in hours is a signal of increasing audit quality
to market participants. We also find consistent evidence
that audit fees increase with relative efficiency. In the
extant literature, it is suggested that audit fees increase
based on an audit firm’s incentive to reduce business risk
and reputational damage. Therefore, audit fees may be
imparted to audit clients based on the incentive of audit
firms. However, we find that audit fees per hour has no
relation to relative efficiency, suggesting that audit firms
do not require a risk fee premium based on relative effi-
ciency.
These findings are important for several reasons. First,
the audit effort literature is divided into two approaches
designed to capture i) the influence of audit fees (in-
put) on audit quality (output) and ii) audit hours on
audit quality. The audit fee literature suggests that addi-
tional audit effort is demanded by audit firms to reduce
business/audit risk (Simunic and Stein 1996; Bell et al.
2001; Gul et al. 2003; Bedard and Johnstone 2004; Lyon
and Maher 2005; Abbott et al. 2006; Cahan et al. 2008;
Hogan and Wilkins 2008; Schelleman and Knechel 2010;
Bryan and Mason 2016), based on audit supply theory.
Mixed results are demonstrated in the audit hour liter-
ature with studies suggesting that audit hours both in-
crease (Simunic 1980; Deis and Giroux 1992; O’Keefe
et al. 1994) and decrease (Caramanis and Lennox 2008;
Jung 2016) with audit risk, and are also influenced
by the incentives of stakeholders (Kane and Velury
2004; Niemi 2005; Mitra and Hossain 2007; Knechel
el al. 2008). Relative efficiency captures the ability of
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management to generate sales based on operational in-
puts; thus, relative efficiency is an important perfor-
mance benchmark that requires assurances by stake-
holders. We interpret that management and sharehold-
ers request audit hours to demonstrate that financial re-
porting is robust and financial statements provide a true
and fair view based on additional audit effort in hours
signalling audit quality. The results suggest that audit ef-
fort in hours is requested by stakeholders because audit
hours are considered value adding, consistent with de-
mand theory, as opposed to arguments that audit effort
is imparted to clients by auditors (based on the audit fee
literature).
Second, South Korea is a unique case study because
the economy can be considered both developed in
terms of economic power, but developing in terms of
legal infrastructure. Audit hour information has been
listed on annual reports since 2001 in Korea. Very few
other countries have adopted this rule. Thus, our study
can provide insights for policymakers and legislators in
both developed and developing economies. Europe has
adopted the mandatory audit firm rotation policy to
enhance audit quality (Cameran et al. 2015). However,
the rule was ceased in Korea because the enforcement
of the rule was expensive and has been shown to reduce
audit quality (Choi et al. 2017; Mali and Lim 2018). We
suggest that legislators may mandate that audit effort
in hours be recorded on financial statements as an
international policy because the policy can enhance the
informativeness of financial statements. Furthermore,
Ettredge et al. (2014) suggest that securing audit effort
could be considered a strategy to enhance earnings qual-
ity, with survey evidence reporting that auditors feel
time pressure to complete audits (Lambert et al. 2017).
We surmise that listing audit hour engagement infor-
mation on financial statements can be considered an
inexpensive policy to enhance financial statement trans-
parency. We also surmise that it is in the best interests of
the general public if a comparative audit effort bench-
mark is made available to compare equivalent firms
including going concerns and bankrupt institutions.
Finally, we clearly identify a different relationship be-
tween relative efficiency and audit hours, and absolute
efficiency and audit hours. The majority of previous
studies suggest that firms with higher ROA require lower
audit effort in fees (Gul and Goodwin 2010; Eshleman
and Guo 2013). However, we find that the relationship
between relative efficiency and audit hours is positive.
Whilst there is evidence to suggest that efficiency per-
formance is a form of risk (Nguyen and Swanson 2009),
client firms have an incentive to signal higher perfor-
mance based on relative efficiency because market par-
ticipants can interpret that it is easier to manipulate fi-
nancial statement values (absolute efficiency) compared
to the operational resources under the control of man-
agement. Previous studies interpret both types of effi-
ciency to represent different types of real-world phe-
nomena (Baik et al. 2013). However, we are the very first
to show that they are different forms of efficiency that
have different influences on audit effort in hours. We
would encourage future performance studies to distin-
guish between absolute and relative efficiency to provide
further insights into the reliability of simple but super-
ficial measures.
To conclude, we list limitations. Whilst our model is
robust based on our test statistics, controls, the division
of firms based on risk and numerous additional anal-
yses, there is the potential for an unobservable effect
to influence audit effort. We are unable to control for
audit quality determinants including audit office size
(Francis and Yu 2009; Choi et al. 2010; Francis et al.
2012) and auditor experience (Carson et al. 2012) be-
cause the data are publicly unavailable in South Korea.
Because this information is unavailable, we posit that
these variables may not be considered a signal of audit
quality by market participants or stakeholders of client
firms. The literature also suggests that audit disclosures
are associated with audit quality (Schultz and Reckers
1981; Lee et al. 2003; Knechel et al. 2015). However, the
IFRS (2017) criticise audit disclosures, reporting that
i) there is not enough relevant information; ii) there is
too much irrelevant information; and iii) information
is not communicated effectively in audit disclosures.
Our study is based on the assumption that whilst audit
disclosures can be considered informative in some
economies, because audit hour information is available
on a comparative basis in Korea, it is more accessible
to market participants and can be considered a more
plausible proxy for audit quality.
Finally, in South Korea, the implementation of the au-
ditor retention rule in 1997 triggered a price competi-
tion for audit contracts because client firms received the
power to switch auditors. As a result, audit firms were
incentivised to offer better terms to extend audit con-
tracts (Park and Lee 2008). Furthermore, the introduc-
tion of the mandatory audit firm rotation policy in 2006
led to a situation where audit fees have decreased signif-
icantly (Kwon et al. 2014). Thus, in Korea, there is the
potential that audit firms can agree to provide high lev-
els of audit effort for a discounted fee. Because Korean
firms must disclose audit fees and hours on the annual
report, relatively more efficient firms can take advan-
tage of increasing audit hours and the benefits associ-
ated with a higher level of substantive and control tests.
This paper is therefore based on the premise that an au-
dit firm is a service provider and would reflect the needs
of highly efficient audit firms in the audit plan. Thus,
our results should be interpreted with caution because
they are based on a South Korean context. Future stud-
ies can extend the literature by using an international
comparative analysis approach to develop insights about
the relationship between efficiency performance and the
© 2020 The Authors. Australian Accounting Review published by
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incentives of stakeholders/audit firms to demand/supply
audit effort.
Note
1 Credit ratings are coded as below.
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